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tion (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the
Government National Mortgage Association
(Ginnie Mae). Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Both
are publicly chartered, privately owned corpora-
tions. They are regulated by the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight for financial safety
and soundness and by HUD for compliance with
their public mission. Ginnie Mae is a wholly
owned government corporation within HUD.
For these organizations, I briefly recount their
history and operations. I review their economic
functions and highlight current issues about their
F
ederal policy affecting housing is
dominated by indirect off-budget
activities—tax expenditure policies
and credit, insurance, and guarantee
programs—rather than the direct subsidy of
housing production or the payment of shelter
allowances to deserving households. This paper
reviews federal activity in providing credit and
insurance for housing. I begin by reviewing
mortgage insurance and guarantee programs:
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and
the Veterans Administration (VA). These large
programs are administered by different cabinet
agencies: the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and the Department of
Veterans Affairs, respectively.1
I then review federally supported credit
activities: the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
This paper reviews the evolution of the major credit and insurance programs undertaken by the
U.S. government in support of urban housing. As the review makes clear, the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), Veterans Administration, Federal National Mortgage Association, and
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation have played major roles in the development of liberal
and efficient primary and secondary mortgage markets in the United States. The development 
of capacity in mortgage lending and securitization in the private sector does suggest, however,
that federally subsidizing mortgage market activities can be restrained with little effect on home-
ownership—the principal goal of this federal activity. In particular, the orderly reduction in the
mortgage investment activities of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and the imposition
of guarantee fees on mortgage-backed securities insured by the GSEs are first steps in restraining
federal activity. More generally, a concentration of FHA and GSE activity on first-time homebuyers
would reduce federal risk exposure while preserving the economic rationale for government
activity.
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1 A third program, the Farm Service Administration, insures farms
and some rural homes. It is administered by the Department of
Agriculture.
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Before the depression of the 1930s, home
mortgage instruments were typically of short
terms (3 to 10 years) with loan-to-value ratios
(LTVs) of 60 percent or less. Mortgages were non-
amortizable, requiring a balloon payment at the
expiration of the term. The onset of the Great
Depression engendered a liquidity crisis begin-
ning in 1930, preventing renewal of outstanding
contracts. Other borrowers were simply unable
to make regular payments. The liquidity crisis
affecting new mortgage loans, together with ele-
vated default rates on existing loans, had cata-
strophic effects on housing suppliers as well as
housing consumers.
Figure 1 shows the course of house building
during the twentieth century. It reports the sus-
tained boom in housing construction in the
1920s—peaking in 1925 but averaging more
than 700,000 housing starts per year from 1920
through 1929. The figure also depicts the collapse
of the housing market at the onset of the Great
Depression. During the period 1930-35, housing
starts declined by 75 percent, to about 193,000
per year.
Despite voluntary forbearance on the part of
some lending institutions and mandated forbear-
ance enacted by many state legislatures, the system
of mortgage lending that existed in the early 1930s
continued to contract, and many lending institu-
tions simply failed. The establishment of the Home
Owners’ Loan Corporation in 1933 within the
Federal Home Loan Bank System (established a
year earlier) provided stop-gap refinancing for a
million mortgages.2 Passage of the National
Housing Act of 1934 established the structure
of home mortgage insurance and facilitated the
growth of the modern system of mortgage finance
in the United States.
The 1934 Act established the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) to oversee a program of
home mortgage insurance against default. Insur-
ance was funded by the proceeds of a fixed pre-
mium charged on unpaid loan balances. These
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Figure 1
U.S. Housing Starts, 1900-2004
SOURCE: Doan (1997); www.census.gov/const/startsan.pdf.
2 These measures are described in Doan (1997).revenues were deposited in Treasury securities and
managed as a mutual insurance fund. Significantly,
default insurance was offered on “economically
sound” self-amortizing mortgages with terms as
long as 20 years and with LTVs up to 80 percent.
Diffusion of this product across the country
required national standardization of underwriting
procedures. Appraisals were required, and bor-
rowers’ credit histories and financial capacities
were reported and evaluated systematically. The
modern standardized mortgage was born.3
The Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, which
was established to manage the reserve of annual
premiums, was required to be actuarially sound.
This was generally understood to involve very
small redistributions from high-income to low-
income mortgagees. (See, for example, Aaron,
1972.) By its original design, the FHA was clearly
intended to serve the vast majority of homeowners.
Initial loan amounts were restricted to be no larger
than $16,000 at a time when the median house
price was $5,304.4
Near the end of World War II, it was widely
feared that the peacetime economy would return
the housing market to its depression-era perform-
ance. From Figure 1, note that housing starts in
1944 were at about the same level as they had been
a decade earlier. The VA loan program, passed as
a part of the GI bill in 1944, rapidly evolved from
a temporary “readjustment” program to a long-
range housing program available to veterans for
a decade or more after returning to civilian life.
This transformation contributed to the boom in
the residential construction industry that began
in the late 1940s. Ultimately, a liberal program of
veterans’ home loans was established in 1950 and
subsequently extended. In contrast to the insur-
ance provided by the FHA, the VA provided a
federal guarantee for up to 60 percent of the face
value of a mortgage loan made to an eligible vet-
eran, subject to a legislated maximum. The VA
program facilitated loans by private lenders on
favorable terms, with no down payments and
with moderate interest rates. 
These two programs providing insurance and
mortgage guarantees brought homeownership
opportunities to middle class American house-
holds in a short space of time. As noted in Figure 1,
since 1950, annual housing starts have rarely
fallen below one million. Figure 2 reports the
remarkable growth of mortgage originations
attributable to these programs. In 1960, about $5
billion in FHA-insured mortgages and $2 billion
in VA-guaranteed mortgages were issued. By 2003,
about $165 billion in FHA-insured mortgages and
about $66 billion in VA-guaranteed mortgages
were issued. In real terms, FHA mortgage activity
has quadrupled during the period since 1960 and
VA originations have increased by 430 percent.
Over time, the fraction of mortgage origina-
tions attributable to the FHA and VA has declined
systematically. Figure 3 reports that the fraction
of originations (in dollar volume) insured by the
FHA declined from as high as 25 percent in 1957
to a bit under 5 percent in 2004. Similarly, VA-
guaranteed mortgages declined from about a
quarter of the value of originations in 1955 to a
couple of percent in 2004. Overall, these programs
accounted for over 40 percent of the dollar volume
of originations in 1957 and 8 percent at the turn
of this century.
The relative reduction in FHA and VA origina-
tions over time has arisen from two factors. First,
the modern private mortgage market—mortgage
banks and suppliers of private mortgage insur-
ance—arose under the shadows of these public
institutions.5 The behavior of consumers with
long-term, low-interest-rate, government-insured
mortgages made it clear that reliance on these
liberal instruments to provide credit could be prof-
itable activities for mortgage suppliers and private
insurers. Default rates just aren’t very high. This
was not well-known or appreciated until the expe-
rience of FHA and VA mortgages was accumulated.
Balances in the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund
were easily observable to private actors.6 This
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3 See Green and Wachter (2005) for an extensive discussion of this
history.
4 The FHA ceiling was reduced to $6,000 in 1938, but that level
was still above the median house price at the time, $5,804. 
5 For example, in 1957, the Mortgage Guaranty Insurance
Corporation became the first private mortgage guarantee firm
established since the Great Depression.
6 The original structure of FHA insurance premiums—an annual
premium against the unpaid mortgage balance—was changed to a
fixed-percentage payment at closing (in 1983) and then to a sliding
scale based on the LTV (in 1990).Quigley
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FHA and VA Shares of Total Originations, 1939-2004
NOTE: Data for 1965-69 total originations are approximate.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (various years); www.huduser.org/periodicals/ushmc/summer99/histdat5.html;
www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/resources/housingmortgage.pdf.made private lenders more inclined to offer com-
petitive liberal mortgage products.
Second, variations in policy—by statute or
practice—affect the extent to which insured mort-
gages can “compete” with the private mortgage
industry. Expansions in coverage shortly after
World War II—higher LTVs and longer repayment
terms—made FHA and VA mortgages more attrac-
tive to lower-income households. But, over time,
fixed-dollar limitations on the loan amounts
greatly reduced the role of the FHA and the VA
in providing insurance to middle- and upper-
middle-income households. Figure 4 reports the
number of FHA and VA mortgages as a fraction of
all insured mortgages. As the figure shows, FHA
and VA mortgages were almost 80 percent of all
insured mortgages in 1987. This fraction declined
by half through 1995 before increasing again when
lending limits were liberalized. Figure 5 estimates,
from the era of the Great Society to the present,
the fraction of new single-family homes whose
selling prices made them eligible for FHA mort-
gage insurance. As the figure indicates, limitations
on the maximum loan amount reduced the poten-
tial coverage from about 90 percent of new homes
completed in 1964 to about 15 percent of new
homes completed three decades later.7 Systematic
increases during the past decade in the maximum
size of mortgages eligible for FHA financing has
increased eligibility again, to as much as one-third
of the new houses completed in 2004.8
The trends reported in Figures 4 and 5 are the
outcomes of policy decisions about the segments
of the owner-occupied housing market in which
the FHA has been authorized to offer mortgage
insurance. Figure 6 shows analogous estimates of
the fraction of new homes eligible for VA guar-
antees. Until 1988, the trend was quite similar.9
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7 The estimates in Figure 5 are quite crude. The distribution of prices
for new homes is reported in gross categories (but the distribution
of prices for existing homes is not available at all). No adjustment
is made for higher-cost FHA regions (for which higher limits were
permitted beginning in 1994).
8 In 1994, the FHA loan limit was increased from a fixed amount to
a fraction of the limit imposed on GSE purchases of mortgages (the
“conforming limit”). As noted below, this limit is revised annually
on the basis of average home prices. The FHA loan limit was set
at 38 percent of the GSE limit and 75 percent of the GSE limit in
high-cost metropolitan areas. In 1998, these limits were further
liberalized to 47 percent and 87 percent, respectively.
9 In 1988, the VA eligibility limit was extended from houses valued
at 1.67 times the maximum guarantee to houses valued at 4 times
the maximum guarantee. This immediately made many more high-
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SOURCE: www.huduser.org/periodicals/ushmc/winter99/histdat4.html.Quigley
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Figure 5
Estimated Percent of New Single-Family Homes Eligible for FHA Insurance, 1964-2004
NOTE: Reported figures are underestimated after 1993.
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Figure 6
Estimated Percent of New Single-Family Homes Eligible for VA Insurance, 1964-2004
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Construction Statistics Series C25 (various years).The rules governing coverage affect the
“market share” of government-insured mortgages
in total originations. Because it was demonstrated
that liberal mortgage terms could be privately
profitable, the eligibility of mortgages for federal
insurance, especially mortgages for the high-valued
properties demanded by high-income buyers,
could be reduced. In this way, a reduced “market
share” of guaranteed mortgages is evidence of the
success and increased targeting of these programs.
To be sure, national house-value limits for FHA
and VA coverage are reflected in the market share
of federally insured properties in various markets.
Until 1994, a much smaller fraction of originations
in high-priced housing markets, especially
Western and Coastal housing markets, were eli-
gible for FHA insurance. As noted below (see
Figures 9 to 11), currently about 15 percent of
newly issued mortgages are federally insured.
Despite these relative declines in the impor-
tance of the FHA in new originations, the vol-
ume of FHA debt outstanding has continued to
rise steadily. Figure 7 reports the long-term trend.
Note that FHA debt outstanding has increased
from under $30 billion in 1985 to about $440 bil-
lion in 2003, a real increase of about 140 percent.
The mission of the FHA was expanded to
include multi-family housing shortly after it was
established. The National Housing Act of 1938
included provisions for a separate insurance pro-
gram for multi-family housing for middle-income
households. A separate reserve fund, the General
Insurance Fund, was created, and it was envi-
sioned that the General Insurance Fund would
also be actuarially sound. But it was not until the
1960s that FHA multi-family housing programs
became significant in size and scale.
A series of Great Society housing programs
relied for the first time on privately owned multi-
family housing to provide subsidized rental
accommodation. Other programs subsidized
homeownership directly.10 These programs
combined subsidized interest rate mortgages,
lower underwriting standards, and government
insurance provided by the FHA.11 The volatile
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FHA-Insured Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 1949-2003
SOURCE: Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President (various years, Table B-76).
10 Aficionados of U.S. housing policy may recall the “colorful”
program titles: Section 221(d)(3), Section 235, and Section 236,
to name the most notorious.
11 Beyond these specific programs, the National Housing Act of 1968
directed the FHA, more generally, to lower underwriting standards
in declining metropolitan areas. combination of liberal underwriting standards
and loss insurance was enough to cause “smoke
and fire,” and additional allegations of inefficiency
and corruption drew further attention to the
“problems” of the FHA.12 It should be noted, how-
ever, that even in the absence of waste, fraud, or
corruption, the design of these programs made
the insurance provided by the FHA very expen-
sive to U.S. taxpayers.
Two decades later, in the late 1980s, many of
the successful FHA-insured subsidized multi-
family projects reached the end of their compli-
ance terms without the prospect of new subsidized
financing and after the Tax Reform Act of 1986
had greatly reduced the returns to the syndication
of apartments in the private-rental market. With
long-lived capital, initial mistakes can be manifest
for a long time. The General Insurance Fund and
other reserve funds for the FHA multi-family
housing programs have repeatedly required leg-
islative appropriations to remain solvent.
Although these problems with the multi-family
housing component of the FHA subsidized port-
folio have been widely reported, it should be noted
that lending for multi-family housing has never
been a large fraction of the FHA portfolio, and its
relative importance has systematically declined.
As noted in Figure 8, multi-family housing insur-
ance as a fraction of guaranteed and insured mort-
gages declined from about 15 percent in 1970 to
less than 8 percent at the turn of this century.
In contrast, the mortgage insurance fund for
the FHA single-family housing insurance pro-
gram has remained solvent continuously and, with
the exception of a few brief intervals, the fund has
remained actuarially sound as well. Premium
variations with LTVs have introduced some ele-
ment of risk-based pricing, and variations in eligi-
bility limits have kept enough low-risk borrowers
in the pool.
For eligible households, the down-payment
requirements and underwriting standards
employed by the FHA have proven to be attractive
when compared with the terms offered by con-
ventional lenders. The Housing and Community
Development Act of 1981 established explicit
targets for serving low-income borrowers. These
goals facilitated a lending environment in which
the overwhelming fraction of FHA borrowers
12 These issues are discussed in detail by Vandell (1995).
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Multi-family and Commercial Share of FHA and VA Portfolio, 1949-2003
SOURCE: Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President (various years, Table B-75 ).obtained mortgages with LTVs of 95 to 98 percent
or more (as compared with 80 to 90 percent for
conventional loans). FHA underwriting standards
led to the acceptance of borrowers with “non-
traditional” credit histories or with imperfect
records. The diffusion of methods of credit scoring
of borrowers makes it possible to compare the
credit worthiness of FHA borrowers with those
served by the conventional mortgage market. The
availability of low-down-payment FHA mortgages
and FHA mortgages for those with less-than-
perfect credit scores has meant that the FHA
market share of originations has been larger for
those traditionally disadvantaged in the home-
ownership market. Figure 9 presents estimates
of the number of FHA and VA mortgage origina-
tions in metropolitan areas as a fraction of all
originations separately by race.13
As reported in the figure, in 1997 the FHA and
VA had about a 20 percent share of mortgages
issued to white borrowers. For black and hispanic
borrowers, the market shares were 46 percent and
48 percent, respectively. By 2003, the FHA and
VA market share for all borrowers had declined.
For whites it declined to about 16 percent. For
black and hispanic borrowers, it declined to 33
percent and 27 percent, respectively.
Figure 10 reports the FHA and VA market
share by the income of the census tract in which
the borrower resides. In 1997, they had a 16 per-
cent share of mortgages in upper-income neighbor-
hoods and a 35 percent share of originations in
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. By
2003, the FHA and VA originated 8 percent of
mortgages in upper-income neighborhoods and
about twice that fraction in low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods.
Figure 11 reports analogous FHA and VA
market-share information by the fraction of
minorities living in the census tract of origination.
Here, market shares converged more rapidly
during the 1997-2003 period.
Ambrose and Pennington-Cross (2000) have
analyzed the market share of FHA mortgages
across metropolitan regions in the United States.
Quigley
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13 These estimates are based on data reported under the Home














FHA and VA Market Share of Originations by Borrower’s Race, 1997-2003
SOURCE: www.ffiec.gov/hmda/online_rpts.htm.Quigley



































FHA and VA Market Share of Originations by Minority Population as a Percent of the Census
Tract, 1997-2003
SOURCE: www.ffiec.gov/hmda/online_rpts.htm.Their analysis suggests that FHA activity is higher
in cities and metropolitan areas where economic
risks are higher and where the probability of reces-
sion is greater. When conventional underwriters
reduce lending in local markets, the FHA takes up
some of the slack. (See also Ambrose, Pennington-
Cross, and Yeazer, 2002.)
Table 1 reports the distribution of FHA and
VA new business from 1997 to 2003 along the
same three dimensions used in Figures 9 to 11.
Although the market share of white borrowers is
less than 20 percent, about two-thirds of new
mortgages are made to white borrowers. Since
1997, there has been a small increase in the frac-
tion of mortgage originations to minority borrow-
ers and a decline, from 67 percent to 65 percent,
in the fraction of white borrowers. There has been
a larger increase in the fraction of new mortgage
originations in low- and moderate-income census
tracts, from 43 percent to 50 percent, and a sub-
stantial decline, from 39 to 25 percent, in the
fraction of mortgages originated in census tracts
whose population was 90 percent or more non-
hispanic white. Low- and moderate-income cen-
sus tracts have experienced a larger increase in
the portfolio of new mortgages, from 43 to 50
percent; and there has been an even more sub-
stantial increase in the fraction of FHA and VA
mortgage originations in minority neighborhoods.
Given borrower characteristics, lower down
payments, and looser underwriting standards,
government-insured and -guaranteed mortgages
are somewhat riskier than conventional loans.
Figure 12 compares foreclosure rates on FHA, VA,
and conventional mortgages over the past 30 years.
Foreclosure rates on conventional mortgages were
very low, increasing after 1981 to about 0.7 per-
cent. In absolute terms, FHA foreclosure rates are
low, but they also increased after 1981 and now
average between 1 and 3 percent. These rates are
about half again as high as the foreclosure rates
on VA loans and two-and-one-half times as large
as the foreclosure rates on conventional mortgages.
There is a slightly increasing trend in foreclosure
rates for all mortgages, and the trend is a bit higher
for FHA loans.
Quigley
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Table 1
Distribution of New FHA and VA Mortgages by Borrower Race, Income, and Neighborhood,
1997-2003
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Race
White 67 67 58 63 65 64 65
Black 13 13 16 14 13 13 13
Hispanic 14 14 18 17 17 17 17
Other 6 6 7 6 6 6 5
Income
Low to moderate 43 45 46 45 47 50 50
Middle 36 35 35 35 34 32 32
Upper 20 20 19 20 19 18 17
Percentage of Minorities in Census Tract
<10 39 39 39 39 41 41 25
10-49 48 48 48 48 47 47 55
50-79 888877 1 2
$8 0 6555558
SOURCE: www.ffiec.gov/hmdadawebreport/nataggwelcome.aspx.ECONOMIC EFFECTS
It seems clear that the institution of single-
family housing insurance and guarantee programs
played a leading role in developing the American
mortgage market. After a half century, however,
it is also clear that these institutions now play a
less central role in expanding homeownership
opportunities for U.S. households. There are, how-
ever, at least three salutary effects of this public
intervention in the mortgage market. 
First, these government agencies may be pre-
sumed to be less discriminatory than private actors
in the mortgage market. Racial discrimination in
homeownership markets has been well docu-
mented for three decades (e.g., Kain and Quigley,
1975, and Munnell et al., 1986). Although the
precise mechanism underlying this discrimination
is unclear, and actions may be based on statistical
discrimination as well as simple prejudice (see,
especially, Ross and Yinger, 2002), there is sub-
stantial and continuing discrimination against
minority households in the market. Government
action in providing insurance is but one tool to
help rectify this inequity and to increase minority
access to homeownership.
Figure 9 provides some indirect evidence on
this point. The large FHA market share among
African Americans and Hispanics reflects the
number of these households who are eligible for
the program. However, the large uptake of FHA
mortgages among minority households also sug-
gests that the institution serves minority borrowers
and their lenders. 
Second, the continuing demonstration pro-
vided by the looser terms for government mort-
gages may increase homeownership more
generally among the eligible population. However,
the accumulated experience of private mortgage
insurance and the recent technical developments
in quantifying potential default risk among bor-
rowers suggest that the private sector may be quite
capable of supplying credit at terms comparable
to those provided by the FHA. Thus, the current
programs provided by the FHA may increase
homeownership among the eligible population,
but the elimination of the FHA might simply
induce private lenders to be more aggressive in
this segment of the market.
Quigley














Mortgage Foreclosure Rates, 1961-2002
NOTE: Data for 1972 are approximate.
SOURCE: Mortgage Bankers of America, National Delinquency Reports (various years).Third, those eligible homeowners who are
“inframarginal”—that is, their homeownership
probabilities are unaffected by the existence of
the FHA—may be able to buy somewhat more
expensive houses in better neighborhoods as a
result of the program. 
There is considerable research using a variety
of national datasets analyzing the effects of the
FHA on the homeownership rates of households.
The most widely reported of these studies, govern-
ment reports commissioned by HUD,14 conclude
that a quite substantial number of U.S. households
have become homeowners as a result of the FHA.
These government-sponsored surveys examine
samples of recent home purchasers, noting (i)
those who purchased using conventional mort-
gages with private mortgage insurance, (ii) those
veterans who would have been unable to purchase
with private insurance but who were able pur-
chase with a VA loan, and (iii) those who could
not buy their home with private mortgage insur-
ance or a VA loan but who could afford to buy it
with an FHA loan. The studies suggest that the
second category measures the effectiveness of
the VA in stimulating homeownership and the
third category measures the effectiveness of the
FHA. But these methods clearly overestimate the
effects of these institutions—because the private
mortgage industry would certainly expand in
these market segments in the absence of govern-
ment programs. In addition, many households
who barely qualify to purchase their homes under
government programs would continue to qualify
for homeownership by simply purchasing other,
less expensive, houses in the absence of govern-
ment programs.
Other studies have examined micro data sets
to estimate the fraction of renters or potential
house buyers who would qualify for home pur-
chase under FHA qualification rules but not under
conventional underwriting criteria. For example,
Savage and Fronczek (1993) analyzed renters in
the Survey of Income and Program Participation,
concluding that the FHA adds only a narrow seg-
ment of the population to the pool of potential
home buyers. Using micro data from the American
Housing Survey, Lafayette, Haurin, and
Hendershott (1995) calibrated a model of tenure
choice for young households and simulated the
change in homeownership patterns if the down
payment and income rules of the FHA were elimi-
nated. Their results suggested that only a very
small increase in homeownership rates among
young adults could be attributed to the FHA.
Goodman and Nichols (1997) analyzed two
waves each of data collected by the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics and by the National Longi-
tudinal Study of Youth, investigating the fraction
who would qualify for an “FHA-only” mortgage
at the beginning and the end of a five-year interval.
The authors found that the overwhelming majority
of those who qualified for FHA-only mortgages
at the initial period qualified for a conventional
mortgage at the end of the interval. From this they
conclude that the effect of the FHA on homeowner-
ship is to accelerate ownership, not to increase
homeownership.15 (Note John Weicher’s elabora-
tion on the significance of this finding in his
commentary on this paper.)
Monroe (2001) analyzed the Public Use Micro
Samples (PUMS) generated by the U.S. Census in
1970, 1980, and 1990 for metropolitan households.
He exploited metropolitan variation in loan limits
and temporal variation in underwriting standards
to estimate the fraction of metropolitan dwellings
that a given household in the PUMS could afford
with an FHA loan but not with a conventional
loan. He found that the temporal and spatial vari-
ation in this measure is significantly associated
with homeownership. In particular, he found that
the FHA increased homeownership by 0.6 percent-
age points, on average, during the 1970-90 period.
Among those most affected by the FHA (i.e., those
at the 90th percentile of the fraction), homeowner-
ship increased by 1.6 percentage points.
Significantly, the estimated effect of the FHA
on the homeownership of black households was
twice as large on average (1.4 percentage points
at the mean) and more than twice as large among
those most affected by the FHA (3.7 percentage
points at the 90th percentile).
Quigley
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14 See, for example, Bunce et al. (1995).
15 This suggests that the FHA will become less effective in accelerating
homeownership as the population ages.  And it also suggests that
the “acceleration” of homeownership may reduce the savings rate
in the cohort of those contemplating a first-time home purchase.MORTGAGE CREDIT
Federal support for housing credit also began
in the aftermath of the Great Depression, with the
establishment of the Federal Home Loan Bank
(FHLB) System in 1932. FHLBs were chartered
by Congress to provide short-term loans to insti-
tutions to help stabilize mortgage lending in local
credit markets. These loans (“advances”) were
made to thrift institutions that specialized in retail
mortgage finance. Interest rates on advances were
determined by the low rates at which the FHLB
System Board could borrow in the credit market.
In 1938, the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) was established as a wholly owned gov-
ernment corporation to facilitate a secondary
market for the newly established FHA mortgage
program. The willingness of the FNMA to buy
these mortgages encouraged lenders to make FHA
and, later, VA loans (see Haar, 1960, for a histor-
ical discussion).
In 1968, the Association was reconstituted as
a GSE, Fannie Mae. Much of its portfolio of govern-
ment-insured mortgages was transferred to the
newly established Ginnie Mae, and its common
stock was sold and publicly traded.16 The newly
constituted Fannie Mae continued the practice
of issuing debt to buy and hold mortgages, but
expanded its operations to include the purchase of
conventional mortgages not guaranteed or insured
by the federal government.
Freddie Mac was established as a GSE in 1970.
Freddie Mac was originally organized to buy
mortgages originated by thrift institutions, and
its shares were owned by FHLBs. Freddie Mac
did not become a publicly traded firm until 1989.
Originally, Freddie Mac chose not to hold pur-
chased mortgages in its portfolio. Instead, mort-
gages were pooled and interests in those pools,
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), were sold to
investors, with the default risk guaranteed by
Freddie Mac.17
Figure 13 is a schematic of the structure of
the secondary mortgage market as it has evolved.
16 The reorganization was, in large part, a response to changes in
government accounting conventions that would otherwise have
recorded net additions to the FNMA portfolio as federal expendi-
tures (see Aaron, 1972).
17 This structure is essentially identical to that which had been
adopted by Ginnie Mae in their pass-through securities. Ginnie Mae
securities, however, bore an explicit credit guarantee by the federal
government.
Quigley
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Figure 13
Schematic of MBS Industry
SOURCE: Inside MBS and ABS.Mortgages insured by the FHA or guaranteed by
the VA are securitized and guaranteed by Ginnie
Mae. These securities are guaranteed by the full
faith and credit of the U.S. government. Other
mortgages, subject to specific balance (“conform-
ing”) limits18 and underwriting guidelines, are
securitized by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. These
MBS are guaranteed against default risk by the
GSEs themselves. Other mortgages, which do not
conform to the balance limits or underwriting
guidelines imposed by Fannie and Freddie, are
routinely securitized by other private entities.
These “private label” MBS may be insulated from
default risk through overcollaterization, subordi-
nation, or other forms of credit enhancement.
Private-label MBS are standard finance products
in which credit risk may be allocated among differ-
ent tranches of a security, allowing final investors
to tailor their holdings to their risk preferences.
The principal government subsidy provided
to the GSEs arises because the debt instruments
issued by them and the MBS guaranteed by them
are perceived to be more secure than those issued
by comparable institutions that do not operate
under a federal charter.19 Although debt and
securities issued by the GSEs clearly state other-
wise, investors view the guarantees made by the
GSEs as if they were made by the federal govern-
ment itself. Some fraction of this benefit is passed
through by the GSEs to mortgage borrowers, in
the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and to
borrowers of FHLB institutions (mostly mortgage
borrowers as well, but also to other clients of these
institutions). The residual fraction of this benefit
is retained by the shareholders of the GSEs. This
residual arises from the GSEs competitive advan-
tage, conferred by their federal charter, over other
financial institutions that operate without such a
charter.
The size and growth of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are indicated in Figures 14 through
17. Between 1975 and 2000 the total assets of
Fannie Mae increased 21-fold and the total assets
of Freddie Mac grew 78-fold. As noted in
Figure 14, during the past decade alone, Fannie
Mae increased its assets by 365 percent and
Freddie Mac by 650 percent. 
The principal lines of business of these firms,
the issuance of MBS and the investment in whole
mortgages, increased commensurately. As indi-
cated in Figure 15, during 1993-2003, the volume
of outstanding MBS issued by Fannie Mae almost
tripled to $1.3 trillion, while the volume of out-
standing MBS issued by Freddie Mac almost
doubled to over $750 billion. 
Figure 16 reports the retained portfolios of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These portfolios
consist of a mixture of whole loans, individual
mortgages, and MBS which are owned by these
firms and retained for investment purposes.
These portfolios are large, and they have grown
quite rapidly in the recent past. Between 1997
and 2003, the retained portfolios of the GSEs have
tripled in size. As indicated in Figure 17, Fannie
Mae’s debt outstanding in 2003 was $962 billion,
up from $201 billion a decade before. Freddie
Mac’s debt outstanding in 2004 was $732 billion,
up from $93 billion a decade before. These are very
large firms that have grown rapidly, especially in
the past decade.
Just as the FHA shaped the primary mortgage
market in the United States, so the rapid growth
of the GSEs beginning in the 1970s led to funda-
mental changes in the secondary mortgage market.
Until the 1970s, U.S. mortgage finance hardly
differed from the caricature of the James Stewart
movie of 1946. Banks and thrift institutions mobi-
lized savings and originated mortgages, which
were then kept as assets in their portfolios. After
origination, these same institutions serviced the
mortgages, collecting payments and guarding
against delinquencies.  Indeed, despite the growth
of national pension funds and institutionalized
investors, Weicher (1994) reported that this local-
ized structure characterized some 60 percent of
the mortgage market as late as 1968.
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18 The “conforming loan limit,” the maximum size of a mortgage
loan that can be purchased or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, changes annually. It is indexed to the national average
home price as estimated by the Federal Housing Finance Board.
The 2005 limit is $359,650.
19 The GSEs benefit from several other subsidies as well. For example,
they are exempt from state and local taxation and from certain
Securities and Exchange Commission filing requirements as well.
See Frame and White (2005) for a discussion and Congressional
Budget Office (2001) for an estimate of their magnitude.Quigley



























Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae Total MSB Outstanding, 1986-2003
SOURCE: http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/2005reporttocongress.pdf.Quigley























Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae Total Debt, 1986-2003
SOURCE: http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/2005reporttocongress.pdf.The growth of the GSEs facilitated a com-
pletely decentralized process, with a variety of
firms specializing in different aspects of the sec-
ondary market. Now, thrifts and mortgage banks
originate mortgages, or independent mortgage
brokers originate mortgages on behalf of banks.
After origination, these firms sell the mortgages
to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and sell the serv-
icing rights to other specialized firms. Fannie and
Freddie may hold the mortgages as investments
or they may create MBS that are sold to individual
investors, institutions, pension funds, or banks.
The two lines of business undertaken by the
GSEs are represented in Figures 15 and 16. Both
benefit directly from the subsidy provided by the
implicit federal guarantee of creditworthiness.
In the first line of business—the issuance of MBS—
the GSEs buy mortgages from originators and issue
MBS, which the agencies guarantee against default
risk. Often, mortgage originators repurchase secu-
rities formed from the same mortgage pools they
sell to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.20 Specifi-
cally, the GSEs sell off a “package”: the cash flows
from an underlying mortgage pool guaranteed
against default, minus an annual fee charged on
unpaid balances. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can
sell this package at a lower price than other private
firms because their guarantee is implicitly backed
up by the full faith and credit of the federal govern-
ment. As indicated in Figure 15, the total MBS
outstanding in 2003 and guaranteed by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac was $2,053,330,000.
In the second line of business, the GSEs issue
debt and use the proceeds to invest, mostly in
mortgages or in MBS. The implicit guarantee
enables the firms to pay lower rates on the debt
they issue, increasing the profitability of their
investment in a portfolio of mortgages. As indi-
cated in Figure 16, the total retained portfolios of
whole mortgages and MBS held by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac in 2003 was $1,562,411,000.
In principle, the subsidy provided by the
implicit guarantee can be calculated. Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac issue debt in the same market
in which other participants in the banking and
finance industry participate. The yield difference
(“spread”) between the debt of the GSEs and that
of other firms can be applied to the newly issued
GSE debt to compute the funding advantage in
any year arising from the yield difference. Of
course, it is not quite straightforward to apply this
principle and to produce credible estimates. The
relevant benchmark estimate (i.e., the appropriate
sector and bond rating) is not without controversy,
and a comparison with broad aggregate indices
combines bonds containing a variety of embedded
options. Pearce and Miller (2001), among others,
reported comparisons of the GSEs and AA-rated
financial firms, suggesting that the agencies
enjoyed a 37-basis-point spread. More sophisti-
cated comparisons by Nothaft, Pearce, and
Stevanovic (2002) suggest that this spread is 27
basis points between the GSEs and AA-minus-
rated firms. A careful analysis of yields for GSE
debt and the option-free debt issued by a selection
of finance industry corporations, by Ambrose and
Warga (2002), concludes that the GSEs enjoy a
25- to-29-basis-point spread over AA-rated bank
bonds and a 37- to 46-basis-point spread over
AA-rated firms. Table 2 provides a terse summary
of available estimates. These estimates are in the
range of the (41-basis-point) spread assumed by
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2001) in
estimating the annual federal subsidy to the GSEs.
This is similar to the (40-basis-point) estimated
spread used by Passmore (2005) in a similar
exercise.21
Estimates of this funding advantage have been
used by the CBO (2001) to calculate the net present
value of the implicit subsidy embedded in GSE
debt issued in any year. The subsidy estimates are
large, about $5.5 billion per year for Fannie Mae’s
newly issued debt during 1998, 1999, and 2000 and
about $4.3 billion per year for Freddie Mac’s newly
issued debt during 1998, 1999, and 2000.22
20 In this way, the banks and thrifts benefit from the elimination of
credit risk and from the lower capital requirements imposed on
guaranteed MBS rather than on an equivalent balance of whole
mortgages.
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21 Many of these estimates have been scrutinized and criticized by
the GSEs themselves, and there is still considerable controversy
about the magnitudes of the appropriate GSE spread. See Blinder,
Flannery, and Kmihachi (2004).
22 The aggregate annual subsidy, including tax and regulation subsi-
dies, was estimated to be $10.6 billion in 2000 for Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac (and $13.6 billion with the subsidies to the FHLBs
included) (CBO, 2001). For 2003, the subsidy to Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae arising from their federal charters was estimated to be
$19.6 billion (CBO, 2004).Passmore (2005) extended the CBO reasoning,
after deriving more precise estimates of spreads,
to approximate the capitalized value of all cur-
rently outstanding debt issued by the GSEs. He
concluded that the gross value of the subsidy is
$122 to $182 billion.23
ECONOMIC EFFECTS
The economic effects of the GSEs can be
divided into two components: those that are
reflected in the housing and mortgage market and
within the firms and those that effect the broader
economy. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are large
corporations, and as such their effects may be
much broader than those affecting housing and
home mortgage rates. 
Housing Market Effects 
The substantial subsidies arising from the
competitive advantage of the GSEs means that
mortgage rates for homeowners can be lower
than they otherwise would be; that is, the sub-
sidy can improve the lot of homeowners and
home purchasers.
But, of course, in the first instance, the subsidy
is provided to private profit-making firms with
fiduciary duties to their shareholders. It is thus
not obvious that all, or even most, of this public
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23 Passmore’s calculations also suggest that the net subsidy to the
GSEs is $53 to $106 billion and that 44 to 89 percent of the GSEs’
current market value is attributable to this subsidy. 
Table 2
Estimates of GSE Funding Advantage
Spread in 
Author Data Comparison basis points
U.S. Department of the Treasury (1996) Bloomberg Agency vs. A financials 53-55
Ambrose and Warga (1996) Fixed Income Fannie Mae vs.




Freddie Mac (1996) Lehman Brothers Freddie Mac vs.
relative value AA and A 39
AAA 23
Toevs (2000) Lehman Brothers Fannie Mae vs. AA indices 37
bond indices
Pearce and Miller (2001) Bloomberg Agency vs. AA financials 37
Ambrose and Warga (2002) Fixed Investment Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac vs. 
Securities Database AA banks 25-29
Nothaft, Pearce,  Fixed Investment Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac vs.
and Stevanovic (2002) Securities Database AA debentures 30
A debentures 45
AA medium-term notes 27
A medium-term notes 34
Passmore, Sherlund,  Bloomberg and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac vs.




SOURCE: Nothaft, Pearce, and Stevanovic (2002); Ambrose and Warga (2002); and Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess (2005).subsidy is passed through to homeowners. As
documented by Hermalin and Jaffee (1996), the
secondary market for mortgage securities (at least
for those securities composed of loans conforming
to the rules under which Fannie and Freddie oper-
ate) is hardly a textbook model of competition.
The two GSEs are large, and each has a large mar-
ket share of the conforming segment of the market.
There are high barriers to entry, and the MBS
product is more-or-less homogeneous. Moreover,
mortgage originators have an inherent first-mover
advantage in deciding which newly issued mort-
gages to sell to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This
may force the GSEs to pay a premium for the mort-
gages they purchase. These factors, imperfect com-
petition and adverse selection, may mean that
much of the subsidy accrues to the shareholders
of the GSEs or to the owners of other financial
institutions and not to homeowners. 
In principle, the effects of the GSEs on mort-
gage rates can be calculated by computing and
adjusting the spread between the interest rates
on mortgages that conform to the loan limits and
underwriting guidelines of the GSEs and the rates
on other mortgages. As in the analysis of funding
advantages, it is not quite straightforward to apply
this principle and to produce credible estimates.
(For example, most research compares the rates
paid by borrowers with loans one dollar below the
conforming limit with rates paid by borrowers
with loans one dollar above the limit. But the
latter group of borrowers differs from the former
group, or else they surely would have made an
additional one-dollar down payment and taken a
conforming loan.)
Early analyses, e.g., by Hendershott and
Shilling (1989), compare rates on jumbo and con-
forming mortgages and indicate that this spread
was 24 to 39 basis points. More recent studies,
e.g., Passmore, Sperks, and Ingpen (2002),
McKenzie (2002), and CBO (2001), conclude that
the spread is 18 to 23 basis points. These more
recent studies differ mostly in their application
of more-complex screens to ensure comparable
data for conforming and nonconforming loans.
Table 3, an extension of McKenzie (2002), sum-
marizes these comparisons. More recent work
by Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess (2005) sug-
gests that this spread may be as low as 16 basis
points.24
Thus, it appears that the GSEs’ funding
advantage is about 30 to 40 basis points and the
effect of this is to reduce mortgage rates by 16 to
25 basis points. Stated another way, a bit more
than half of the subsidy rate to the GSEs is trans-
mitted to homeowners in the form of reduced
mortgage interest rates. Presumably, the remainder
is transmitted to the shareholders of the enterprises
or to the owners of other financial institutions.
In 1992, the Federal Housing Enterprises
Financial Safety and Soundness Act established
the regulatory structure of the GSEs and provided
incentives for the GSEs to increase their services
to lower-income households and neighborhoods.
The legislation empowered HUD to set goals for
“affordable housing,” and HUD established three
benchmark goals, which were ultimately finalized
in December 1995. 
The first goal (low-income housing) directs
that a specified fraction of new loans purchased
by the GSEs be originated by households with
incomes below the area median. The second goal
(underserved areas) requires that a specified frac-
tion of mortgages be originated in census tracts
with median incomes less than 90 percent of the
area median, or else in census tracts with a minor-
ity population of at least 30 percent and with a
tract median income of less than 120 percent of
the area median income. The third goal (special
affordable housing) targets mortgages originating
in tracts with family incomes less than 60 percent
of the area median, or else in tracts with incomes
less than 80 percent of the area median and also
located in specified low-income areas.
The goals originally set for 1996 were modest;
for example, that 40 percent of the GSEs’ mortgage
purchases be loans to households with incomes
below the area median. Over time, the HUD goals
24 Of course, other reasons besides the greater liquidity provided by
the GSEs could explain some of the spread between jumbo and
conforming mortgages. Jumbo mortgages are generally prepaid
more aggressively—borrowers have more at stake, if nothing else.
This means that investors will require higher rates on jumbos
merely to compensate. Borrowers with jumbo mortgages have better
credit, and they make larger down payments. Thus the simple
spread between jumbos and conforming mortgages, even if precisely
measured, would exaggerate the effects of the GSEs in reducing
interest rates. See, also, Ambrose, Buttimer, and Thibodeau (2001),
Heuson, Passmore, and Sparks (2001), or Woodward (2004b).
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ple, 56 percent is the 2008 goal for the fraction
of mortgage loans to lower-income households.
Figures 18, 19, and 20 summarize the three goals
and the effectiveness of the GSEs in meeting these
goals.25
Presumably, the rationale for these three goals
is to “demonstrate” the profitability of these kinds
of mortgages and ultimately to increase the supply
of mortgage credit to the borrower groups and
neighborhoods targeted by the regulations.26
There is only minimal evidence on the effective-
ness of this mandated GSE activity on mortgage
credit or housing outcomes. Evidence reported by
Ambrose and Thibodeau (2004) relates only to
geographically targeted lending (and is estimated
from statistical analyses at the metropolitan level).
This evidence provides very weak support for the
effects of targeted GSE purchases on the availabil-
ity of mortgage credit. Other work by Ambrose
and Pennington-Cross (2000) concludes that GSE
purchase rates are insensitive to local economic
conditions. GSE activity does not help stabilize
regional fluctuations. Detailed statistical analysis
by Gyourko and Hu (2002) suggests that GSEs
target low- and moderate-income borrowers who
satisfy the GSEs’ purchase goals but who reside
in relatively higher-income tracts. 
More recent research by Bostic and Gabriel
(2005) analyzes census tract averages of GSE
purchase activity and housing outcomes for census
tracts with median incomes at the boundaries of
those specified in the GSE housing goals and those
specified in the 1977 Community Reinvestment
Quigley
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Table 3
Estimates of Reduction in Mortgage Interest Rates Attributable to GSEs
Reduction in 
Author Time period Region basis points
Hendershott and Shilling (1989) 1986 California 24-39
ICF Incorporated (1990) 1987 California 26
7 States 23
Cotterman and Pearce (1996) 1989-93 California 25-50
11 States 24-60
Pearce (2000) 1992-99 California 27
11 States 24
Ambrose, Buttimer, and Thibodeau (2001) 1990-99 Dallas 16-24
Naranjo and Toevs (2002) 1986-98 U.S. 8-43
Passmore, Sparks, and Ingpen (2002) 1992-99 California 18-23
CBO (2001) 1995-2000 U.S. 23
McKenzie (2002) 1986-2000 U.S. 22
1996-2000 U.S. 19
Ambrose, La Cour-Little, and Saunders (2004) 1995-97 U.S. 6
Woodward (2004b) 1996-2001 U.S. 35-52
Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess (2005) 1997-2003 U.S. 15-18
Blinder, Flannery, and Lockhart (2006) 1997-2003 U.S. 23-29
SOURCE: McKenzie (2002); Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Saunders (2004); Blinder, Flannery, and Lockhart (2006); Passmore, Sherlund,
and Burgess (2005); and Woodward (2004b).
25 In addition, beginning in 2005, HUD imposed specific numerical
goals in these three areas for mortgages issued for new home pur-
chases, excluding refinances.
26 The demonstrations required to meet these mortgage purchase
goals may require alternative mortgage products with different
underwriting criteria and risk estimation. To the extent that these
demonstrations are successful, they will increase liquidity to target
borrowers and neighborhoods.Quigley
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GSE Underserved-Area Housing Goal, 1996-2008: Percent of New Loans Credited Toward Goal
SOURCE: HUD Office of Policy Research and Development.Act. An intensive analysis of California census
tracts finds a positive association between GSE
activity and housing market conditions, home-
ownership rates, and vacancies, but the association
is generally not statistically meaningful. The
authors conclude that “this research suggest[s]
limited direct effects of GSE loan purchase activity
on local housing markets.” Recent research by An,
Bostic, and Deng (2006) suggests good reasons
why this outcome might be anticipated. Their
analysis is based on standard credit-rationing
arguments. As the GSEs increase activity in
selected neighborhoods to fulfill HUD mandates,
they “cream” consumers with the best credit risks
who then receive low-cost conventional mortgages
instead of FHA loans. The FHA, which operates
under a zero-profit constraint, is thus forced to
increase its underwriting standards, thereby reduc-
ing credit availability to higher-risk borrowers.
Using California data, An, Bostic, and Deng (2006)
clearly show that increases in GSE lending activity
in a census tract is associated with decreases in
FHA activity. This is surely an area of research
worthy of more attention. 
Broader Effects on the Economy
The size and scale of the GSEs and their
restricted lines of business provide the opportu-
nity for them to stabilize residential mortgage
markets and to cushion housing from the swings
of monetary policy. This potential role was clearly
recognized at the time the agencies were estab-
lished (Aaron, 1972). To what extent can the GSEs
offset the procyclical patterns of depository insti-
tutions in their holdings of residential mortgages?
Increased stabilization of the housing sector could
arise from the diversification opportunities pro-
vided by the MBS issued by the GSEs or by coun-
tercyclical patterns in the purchases of mortgages
and MBS by the GSEs themselves. During reces-
sions, MBS may be perceived to be sufficiently
less risky than other investments, and this may
reduce outflows of investment from the housing
sector. The GSEs may also be more willing to act
countercyclically than other actors in the capital
market because of their “deeper pockets” (Peek
and Wilcox, 2004).
There is some indirect evidence on this.
Housing starts are no longer predicted by the
Quigley












GSE Special Affordable Housing Goal, 1996-2008: Percent of New Loans Credited Toward Goal
SOURCE: HUD Office of Policy Research and Development.indicia of mortgage credit availability but by
Treasury rates and mortgage interest rates
(McGarvey and Meador, 1991). Mortgage rates
themselves have converged greatly over geo-
graphic regions (Rudolph and Griffith, 1997), and
regional variations in residential investment have
diminished (Browne, 2000).
Peek and Wilcox have provided some direct
evidence on the stabilization issue, exploring
whether the growth of secondary mortgage markets
generally and GSE activities specifically have
affected the cyclicality of mortgage flows (Peek
and Wilcox, 2003) and the cyclicality of housing
starts and residential investment (Peek and Wilcox,
2004). Their findings, based on vector autoregres-
sions covering the period 1968-2001, do support
the hypothesis that the MBS mortgage origination
activities of the GSEs have reduced the procycli-
cality of housing.  Their results also suggest that
GSE activities in managing retained portfolios
are much less important in mitigating cyclical
shocks than are GSE activities in issuing MBS.
Recent work by Lehnert, Passmore, and Sherlund
(2005) suggests a limited scope for MBS and port-
folio purchases in affecting primary mortgage
markets. But Lehnert and his collaborators do find
that the creation of MBS does reduce mortgage
rates.27
Finally, Perli and Sack (2003) suggest that the
mortgage-market hedging activities of the GSEs
increase interest rate volatility and amplify move-
ments in long-term interest rates.
OBSERVATIONS
The structure of the FHA and the GSEs is a
classic example of the path-dependence of many
economic activities. These institutions have
played a leading role in the development of the
primary and secondary mortgage markets and in
defining the current structure of housing finance
in the United States. Yet no one designing a
housing-finance system anew would configure it
much like the current system. 
The economic case for creating a mortgage
market before it existed was strong, and the results
are impressive. But the economic case for subsi-
dizing housing consumption is weak. It is now
recognized that there are some externalities from
homeownership, and the institutional arrange-
ments surrounding the housing market do facili-
tate “forced” savings (Boehm and Schlottmann,
2002). Green and White (1997) analyzed three
national data sets, finding significant effects of
household homeownership in reducing teenage
pregnancy and increasing high-school completion
rates. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) found a
strong linkage between homeownership and a
variety of measures of “social capital.” More
recently, Haurin, Parcel, and Haurin (2002) found
clear evidence of a link between homeownership
and a variety of cognitive and behavioral outcomes
for young children, suggesting that homeowner-
ship by younger adults increases the stock of
human as well as social capital. 
But no one suggests that there are external
benefits to the amount of housing consumed. The
FHA and the GSEs appear to have some small
effects on homeownership, but most of their hous-
ing market effects are on quantities consumed. 
The FHA may increase homeownership by a
percent or so and may have stronger effects on
minority homeownership rates. The operations of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may reduce mort-
gage interest rates by a quarter of a percent, and
this in turn has some positive effect on home-
ownership. But most of the housing market effects
are inframarginal, and much of the economic
effects of the GSEs accrue to shareholders in the
enterprises. It is currently possible to purchase a
house valued at up to $170,000 using an FHA loan,
and the GSEs can buy and securitize mortgages
on owner-occupied houses sold for up to about
$350,000. There is no conceivable externality
that would justify public programs for the high-
income purchasers of these dwellings. So, the first
and perhaps the most practical policy prescription
is to target these programs much more tightly. 
Further increases in the goals set by HUD for
the GSEs are one step in this direction. Increased
27 More specifically, Lehnert, Passmore, and Sherlund (2005) find
that large swings in GSE portfolio purchases do not affect interest
rates. They also find that large swings in GSE-backed MBS issuance
have very small effects on interest rates, but these effects are larger
than the effects of portfolio purchases on interest rates.
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conforming limits or, more realistically, by freez-
ing the current limits for a good long time. But
the best and simplest device to increase targeting
would be simply to limit FHA and GSE mortgage
activity to first-time home buyers. Less than one-
third of home purchasers in any year are first-time
buyers.28 These buyers tend to be younger and of
lower incomes—precisely the group for whom the
putative externalities to individuals and families
are largest.
These changes would, over time, substantially
reduce the magnitude of the federal presence in
the mortgage market. 
There seems little public rationale for the
extensive portfolio holdings of the GSEs. As
noted in Figure 16, portfolio investment has quite
recently become a major line of business for
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and their private
profits are facilitated by their federal charters. But
there is little or no evidence that these investments
stabilize cyclical swings in home purchases or
reduce interest rates to home purchasers. These
large portfolios have real costs. Because the agen-
cies bear the interest rate risk as well as the credit
risk for these portfolios, it is crucial that these
investments be hedged in derivative markets and
in the capital market more generally. As noted
above, there is some evidence (Perli and Sack,
2003) that the dynamic hedging activities of the
GSEs increase the volatility of long-term interest
rates. (See Jaffee, 2003, for a detailed review of
the hedging programs undertaken by Fannie and
Freddie.) It is equally important that the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight regulators
monitor these hedging activities closely so they
can ensure the safety and soundness of the agen-
cies.29 This has high monitoring and transactions
costs, and the risks of inadequate regulation are
quite large. Without these extensive portfolios,
which serve basically private interests, these trans-
actions costs and risks are eliminated. It would
seem prudent to limit substantially the size of
the retained mortgage portfolio managed by the
GSEs. This could easily be achieved by the natural
liquidation of some existing positions. (See Jaffee,
2005, for one specific suggestion.)
The finding that MBS issuance has about the
same effect on primary mortgage market interest
rates as retained portfolio purchases (Lehnert,
Passmore, and Sherlund, 2005) also suggests that
reducing retained portfolios and increasing the
issuance of MBS would have no adverse effects
on housing consumers.
Of course, the mortgages and MBS liquidated
by the GSEs would show up in the portfolios of
some other investors. But there are many banks,
institutional investors, and hedge funds, and there
are only two GSEs. Moreover, these other institu-
tions also invest elsewhere in the economy, not
narrowly in housing, and diversification across a
broader number of investors and a broader spec-
trum of investor classes can only reduce portfolio
risk. 
As noted previously, it is estimated that 44
to 89 percent of the GSEs’ current market value
is attributable to the federal subsidy to these
institutions (Passmore, 2005). By focusing GSE
activities on first-time buyers over time and by
liquidating large fractions of the GSEs’ retained
portfolios, slowly, the institutions could be
reshaped without calamitous effects on share
values in the short run.
Finally, there is the skunk in the middle of
the road. The implicit federal guarantee that GSE
assets are insured is an enormous contingent lia-
bility for the federal government.  Frame and
White (2005) estimate, by a “back of the envelope
calculation,” that the contingent liability is cur-
rently about $288 billion. Lucas and McDonald
(2005) use an options-based approach to estimate
the insurance value of the implicit government
guarantee to the GSEs. Their base-case calculation
indicates a guarantee value of $7.9 billion over a
10-year period. There are two ways to limit this
public exposure. One is to repudiate the implied
guarantee by some form of explicit non-guarantee.
This would probably be hard to do politically, at
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28 Indeed, in 2000 it was estimated that 27 percent of the mortgages
bought by the GSEs were originated by first-time homebuyers (see
www.huduser.org/Datasets/GSE/Profiles19_00.pdf).
29 Of course, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae could adopt financial
strategies to mitigate this interest rate risk completely, by issuing
long-term callable notes to finance their portfolios of long-term
mortgage assets (See Poole, 2005, for example). But, as noted by
Woodward (2004a), the GSEs have incentives not to hedge their
investments fully.least in a convincing fashion.30 The alternative
is to begin charging the GSEs for their disaster
insurance, which currently is provided free and
which they can sell profitably to investors. Of
course, we do not know the right price for this
disaster insurance and it would take a major effort
to produce a credible estimate.31
But we certainly know that the right price for
this service is not zero, and this provides a clear
basis for a guarantee fee imposed by the taxpayers
on loans insured by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
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